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Abstract — Today, Smartphones are very powerful, and many 
of its applications use wireless multimedia communications. 
Prevention from the external dangers (threats) has become a big 
concern for the experts these days. Android security has become 
a very important issue because of the free application it provides 
and the feature which make it very easy for anyone to develop 
and published it on Play store. Some work has already been done 
on the android security model, including several analyses of the 
model and frameworks aimed at enforcing security standards. In 
this article, we introduce a tool called PermisSecure that is able to 
perform both static and dynamic analysis on Android programs 
to automatically detect suspicious applications that request 
unnecessary or dangerous permissions.
Keywords — Android, Operating System Mobile, Privacy, 
Issues, Hackers, Permission, Solution, Protection.
I. InTRoducTIon
sInce the first Android powered phone named The HTC Dream (also known as the T-Mobile G1 in the United States and parts of 
Europe, and as the Era G1 in Poland) was delivered in October 2008 
[1], Android smart phones have grown to the largest global market 
share (76%) among all smartphones shipped in the 4th quarter of 2014 
[2]. In 2014, Google announced that more than billion Android devices 
had been activated [3]. This important popularity of Android and the 
open nature of its application marketplace makes it a prime target for 
attackers. Malware authors can be freely upload malicious applications 
to the Android Play Store waiting for unsuspecting users to download 
and install them. 
 To alert users to the privacy and security ramifications of installing 
an application, Android employs mandatory access control (MAC) in 
the form of an install-time permission system [4]. At installation time, 
an application must request permission to access system resources 
such as location, Internet, or the cellular network, from the user. 
Then the user is presented with a screen allowing him to either grant 
all the permissions or cancel the installation. Since it is not possible 
to selectively accept or deny access privileges. Thus, many users 
simply accept such permission requests without considering their 
implications, which put their private data in the zone of danger [5]. 
For example if an application granted some critical permissions such 
as the INTERNET permission it can controls communication with 
remote servers and if this application was also granted access to the 
Android camera, nothing prevents it from sending the user’s pictures 
to any server on the internet. May 2014, Google had done a Play Store 
updates to simplify the display of the permissions and allow better 
navigation user. They were re-grouped by categories. Therefore, from 
more than 150 permissions, we went to a dozen groups, including 
another category, which includes everything that does not fit elsewhere 
[6]. With the old system, each update of the application, if developer 
added a new permission, the Play Store posted it and the user must 
then accept it. With the new system, developers can add for example 
the permission ACCESS_SUPERUSER that allow him to take control 
of all the features of the phone and storage if his application had 
permissions in the group “another category” [7].
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give 
an overview on the background of our work. Section 3 describes the 
details on the problem caused by permissions requested by android 
applications and their updates. Section 4 gives an overview on related 
work. We proceed in Section 5 with details of the design and user 
interface of our tool. In Section 6, we demonstrate how our tool protects 
the user from permissions and updates challenges by providing the 
results of applying PermisSecure to 120 paid and 456 free applications 
from the Google Play Store. In Section 7 we conclude and summarize 
our results and contributions.
II. BackgRound
To frame the problem, we describe the Android architecture, 
permission system and explain how these permissions requested by an 
application can play an important role in spring of malwares. 
A. Application Package 
An Android application package or apk file is an archive. It contains 
a Dalvik executable (dex file), which is a compiled Android program 
that runs on a Dalvik virtual machine, and a set of resources (non-
executable files like graphics, media files, user interface components, 
etc.). Application packages also contain a manifest (AndroidManifest.
xml), which Android contains meta-information about the application 
like package name, version, supported Android versions, and other 
attributes. These components are digitally signed with the developer’s 
signing key. The developer’s signing certificate can be self-signed and 
is included in the application package [8]. 
B. Deconstructing Application Installation 
Any developer (even those who have not registered with Google) 
can create and distribute applications through the official Google 
Play Store, through third-party markets (e.g., Amazon Appstore) or 
through developer websites (side-loading). The lack of control over 
the application distribution process raises the importance of enforcing 
security within the Android OS. During the installation of a new 
application, permissions are approved prior to installation, but the rest 
of the process remains the same. First, the application package validity 
is verified: the system ensures that the Android application package has 
not been modified or corrupted since being signed, and that it contains 
a valid certificate for the signing key. Then, Android decides whether 
the application is a new installation or should overwrite an existing 
application. If the application being installed has the same package 
attribute in the manifest (e.g., com.google.android.music) as another 
currently installed application, then Android will treat the installation 
as an update. So, the certificate (or set of certificates if signed by 
multiple keys) is compared to the certificate(s) of the already installed 
application. If both applications were signed with the same key(s), then 
the currently installed binary is removed (preserving any user data) 
and the new application is installed in its place. Otherwise, the new 
application is installed as an initial installation. Next Android must 
assign a UID to the application. In this case, the previous application’s 
UID is used. In the case of an initial installation, Android checks if 
the application’s manifest contains the sharedUserId directive. If so, 
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Android looks for any other installed applications that are signed with 
the same key(s) and have sharedUserId specified in their manifest. If 
such applications are found, the application is assigned the same UID; 
otherwise a new UID is created. 
Fig 1. Abstract model of the Android installation process for an application 
package (apk).
Finally permissions must be assigned to the UID[9]. The user is 
prompted to review and approve the permission assignments before 
the application is installed. When UID sharing is not used, permissions 
listed in the application’s manifest are assigned to the UID. When UID 
sharing is used, the UID is assigned the union of all permissions in 
the manifests of applications sharing the UID. If the application is 
updating an already installed application, the permissions listed in the 
updated application’s manifest are assigned to the UID [10].
III. PRoBleM descRIPTIon 
Permission System: Android controls access to system resources 
with install-time permissions by using two-way process. Firstly, 
developer defines the required permissions that are the first requisite 
for performing the functionalities of an application. Secondly, during 
installation time, user must have approved all the requested permissions 
to use an application [11]. Permissions requested by each application 
permissions fall into four levels: 
(1) Normal – These permissions protect access to API calls that 
cannot impart real harm to the user (e.g. SET_WALLPAPER controls 
the ability to change the user’s background wallpaper) and, while 
applications need to request them, they are automatically granted. 
(2) Dangerous – These control access to potentially harmful API 
calls, like those related to spending money or gathering private 
information. For example, Dangerous permissions are required to send 
text messages, read the list of contacts, call numbers, open Internet 
connections, etc. 
(3) Signature – These regulate access to the most dangerous 
privileges, such as the ability to control the backup process or delete 
application packages. They are automatically granted to a requesting 
application if that application is signed by the same certificate (so, 
developed by the same entity) as that which declared/created the 
permission. This level is designed to allow applications that are part of 
a suite, or otherwise related, to share data. 
(4) Signature/System – Same as Signature, except that the system 
image gets the permissions automatically as well. This is designed for 
use by device manufacturers only. 
Menace of Pileup: The security analysis of mobile updating, 
focusing on Android Package Manager brings to light a new category 
of unexpected and security-critical vulnerabilities within Android’s 
update installation logic. Such vulnerabilities, called Pileup (privilege 
escalation through updating), enable an unprivileged malicious 
application to acquire system capabilities once the OS is upgraded, 
without being noticed by the phone user. More specifically, through 
the application running on a lower version Android, the adversary 
can strategically claim a set of carefully selected privileges or 
attributes only available on the higher OS version. For example, the 
application can define a new system permission such as permission.
ADD_VOICEMAIL on Android 2.3.6, which is to be added on 4.0.4. 
It can also use the shared user ID[12] (a string specified within an 
application’s manifest file) of a new system application on 4.0.4, its 
package name and other attributes. Since these privileges and attributes 
do not exist in the old system (2.3.6 in the example), the malicious 
application can silently acquire them (self-defined permission, shared 
UID and package name, etc.). When the system is being updated to 
the new one, the Pileup flaws within the new Package Manager will 
be automatically exploited. Consequently, such an application can 
stealthily obtain related system privileges, resources or capabilities. In 
the above example, once the phone is upgraded to 4.0.4, the application 
immediately gets permission.ADD_VOICEMAIL without the user’s 
consent and even becomes its owner, capable of setting its protection 
level and description. Also, the preempted shared UID enables the 
malicious application to substitute for system applications such as 
Google Calendar, and the package name trick was found to work on the 
Android browser, allowing the malicious application to contaminate its 
cookies, cache, security configurations and bookmarks, etc.
Iv. RelaTed woRk 
Research related to this work can be classified into the following 
categories:
Android Permissions: Previous studies of Android applications 
have been limited in their understanding of permission usage. Enck et 
al. apply Fortify’s Java static analysis tool to decompiled applications; 
they analyze a large set of applications and study their API use [13]. 
However, they are limited to studying application’s use of a small 
number of permissions and API calls. In a recent study, Felt et al. 
manually classify a small set of Android applications as over privileged 
or not [14]. They were unable to reliably differentiate between 
necessary and unnecessary permissions because of limited Android 
documentation.
Update behavior of Android: The first studies has been by done 
Moeller et al. [15] by analyzing the updates of applications from 
Google Play quantitatively. An attack of the android system called 
Application Update Attack is studied by Tenenboim et al. [16]. 
Application updates might be a potential way to implant new security 
vulnerability and privacy data leaks to the user’s phones. Chin et al. 
[17] studied users’s confidence in security and privacy of Android. 
They found that users reported various concerns because of some 
misconceptions or misunderstandings. Android permissions provide 
a mechanism for users to manage the access control of applications, 
especially when fine-grained controls are granted.
Privilege escalation: XManDroid [18] was designed to prevent 
privilege escalation and collusion attacks by enforcing policies 
on the communications between applications, e.g., banning an 
application that has access to the user’s location from interacting with 
an application that is allowed to access the Internet. Aurasium [19] 
repackages applications and introduces an intermediate layer between 
the framework’s native code libraries and the operating system kernel 
inside the application process. AppSealer [20] combines static- and 
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dynamic-code analysis techniques to patch the applications’s bytecode 
in order to mitigate component hijacking attacks. Xing et al.[7] Authors 
introduce a scanner tool for detecting applications that are vulnerable 
against the pileup threat.
v. PeRMIssecuRe InTRoducTIon 
In this section, we present PermisSecure, a tool sandbox based on 
dynamic and static analysis for Android smartphones, which increases 
user awareness about potentially harmful applications in install-time on 
his phone. The concept is based on the assumption that users are willing 
to take security increasing actions (such as canceling the installation of 
a potentially harmful application) once they gain knowledge about a 
potential dangerous or unnecessary permissions requested. 
A. Interface User 
The design and implementation of the PermisSecure user interface 
follows the basic principle of warning, to provide the user with only 
as many pieces of information as necessary to avoid suspicious 
applications. Further, we designed the application to integrate 
seamlessly in the Android system. 
When the user wants to install a new application, the software 
involved to perform an analysis on two levels (See Fig. 5(a)) , the 
first level it analyzes the permissions requested by the application, if 
they are dangerous it displays a warning to the user who can choose 
between contain or cancel the installation (See Fig. 5(b)). Otherwise, 
it goes to the second level of analysis and verifies the code. Therefore, 
if the code is suspicious, it shows to the user a warning same to that 
of the first level, otherwise it allows the installation of the application. 
PermisSecure repeat the process when an application update is 
available (See Fig. 5(c)). 
(a) PermisSecure 
preform an analysis 
in install-time of new 
application.
(b) PermisSecure 
analyzes permissions and 
displays a warning to 
the user who can choose 
between contain or 
cancel the installation.






We applied PermisSecure to 120 paid and 456 free applications from 
the Google Play Store. For the applications to identify the dangerous 
or unnecessary permissions. PermisSecure calculates the maximum 
set of Android permissions that an application may need. We compare 
that set to the permissions actually requested by the application. If the 
application requests more permissions, then it is over privileged.
Unnecessary permission: PermisSecure identified that 45% of free 
and 22% of paid applications have unnecessary permissions. In some 
cases, we were able to determine why developers asked for unnecessary 
permissions.
• Permission Name: Developers sometimes request permissions 
with names that sound related to their application’s functionality, 
even if the permissions are not required. 
• RelatedMethods: Some classes contain a mix of permission-
protected and unprotected methods. We have observed applications 
using unprotected methods but requesting permissions that are 
required for other methods in the same class. For example, android.
provider.Settings.Secure includes both setters and getters. Setters 
require the WRITE_SETTINGS permission, and the getters do not. 
Two applications use the getters and not the setters, but request the 
WRITE_SETTINGS permission.
• Copy and Paste: Popular message boards contain Android code 
snippets and advice about permission requirements. Sometimes 
this information is inaccurate, and developers who copy it will 
over privilege their applications. For example, one application 
in our data sets registers to receive the android.net.wifi.STATE_
CHANGE Intent and requests the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 
permission. As of May 2011, the third-highest Google search result 
for that Intent contains the incorrect assertion that it requires that 
permission [21].
• Deputies: An application can send an Intent to another deputy 
application, asking the deputy to perform an operation. If the 
deputy makes a permission-protected API call, then the deputy 
needs the permission. The sender of the Intent, however, does not. 
We noticed instances of applications requesting permissions for 
actions that they asked deputies to do. For example, one application 
asks the Android Market to install another application. The sender 
asks for INSTALL_PACKAGES, which it does not need because 
the Market application does the installation. Another application 
asks the built-in camera application to take photos, yet requests the 
CAMERA permission for itself.
• Testing Artifacts: A developer might add a permission during 
testing and then forget to remove it when the test code is removed. 
For example, ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION is typically used 
only for testing but can be seen in released applications.
Confusion over permission names, related methods, and Intents 
could be addressed with improved API documentation. We recommend 
listing permission requirements on a per-method (rather than per-class) 
basis. Confusion over deputies could be reduced by clarifying the 





ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 10% 15% Normal 
READ_PHONE_STATE 9% 15% Dangerous 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 6% 8% Normal 
WAKE_LOCK 3% 5% Dangerous 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 5% 7% Dangerous 
ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION 4% 6% Dangerous 
CALL_PHONE 4% 5% Dangerous 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 3% 5% Dangerous 
CAMERA 2% 5% Dangerous 
INTERNET 3% 5% Dangerous 
This table shows that almost all unnecessary requested by 
applications (paid and free) are dangerous.
Dangerous permissions: We are concerned with the prevalence 
of dangerous permissions. Dangerous permissions are displayed as 
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a warning to users during installation and can have serious security 
ramifications if abused. We find that 93% of free and 82% of paid 
applications have at least one dangerous permission, e.g., generate at 
least one warning. Android permissions are grouped into functionality 
categories. This provides a relative measure of which parts of the 
protected API are used by applications. A small number of permissions 
are requested very frequently. In particular, the INTERNET permission 
is heavily used. We find that 14% of free and 4% of paid applications 
request INTERNET as their only dangerous permission. Barrera 
et al. hypothesize that free applications often need the INTERNET 
permission only to load advertisements [22]. The disparity in 
INTERNET use between free and paid applications supports this 
hypothesis, although it is still the most popular permission for paid 
applications. Enck et al. found that some free applications leak 
personal data [23][24], this may explain the difference in ACCESS 
COARSE LOCATION requests. The prevalence of the INTERNET 
permission means that most applications with access to personal 
information also have the ability to leak it. For example, 97% of the 
225 applications that ask for ACCESS FINE LOCATION also request 
the INTERNET permission. Similarly, we find that 99%, 94%, 
and 78% of the 306, 149, and 14 respectively applications that 
request ACCESS COARSE LOCATION, READ CONTACTS, 
and READ CALENDAR have the INTERNET permission. 
Although many applications ask for at least one Dangerous 
permission, the total number of permission requests is typically 
low. Even the most highly privileged application in our set asks 
for less than half of the available 56 dangerous permissions. Fig. 
3 shows the distribution of dangerous permission requests.
Fig 3.   Dangerous permissions per application
Analysis of updates:  The success of a privilege escalation attack 
on an update process depends not only on the presence of Pileup 
vulnerabilities, but also on the new system resources and capabilities 
the update adds that can be acquired by the adversary through the 
attack. Here we present a measurement study in which we ran our 
PermisSecure against a large number of applications for updates 
(183 Apps) to understand the exploit opportunities (new exploitable 
attributes and properties) they bring in.
 We first looked at the overall impacts of the Pileup vulnerabilities 
to the Android ecosystem, in terms of update instance, which refers 
to the upgrade of a specific OS (from a specific manufacturer, on a 
specific device model and for a specific carrier) to a higher one under 
the same set of constraints. For each update instance, we measured 
the quantity of exploiting opportunities it can offer, with regards to 
all the Pileup flaws found in our research, such as the numbers of new 
permissions, packages and shared UIDs an update instance introduces 
to the new system. From the 383 we downloaded, we identified 241 
update instances. The Statistics on their total exploit opportunities in 
each instance are illustrated in Fig. 4. Particularly, we found that 50% 
of those instances have more than 71 opportunities.
Fig 4. Cumulative Distribution of Total Exploit Opportunities in Each Update 
Instance.
vII. conclusIon and fuTuRe woRk
In this paper, we present the design and implementation of 
PermisSecure that analyzes permissions requested by Android 
applications in installing-time and after their updates. Our reference 
implementation is very efficient and induces a small performance 
overhead. Therefore, we have developed this tool especially for users 
without a technical and security background. Our aim was to put 
permission based systems on a stable footing by informing users about 
dubious permission sets. There are several ways to extend the concept 
of creating awareness after applications are installed. First, it would be 
beneficial if the user would be informed before installation for suspicious 
applications. Preferably, the user should be given alternatives, such as 
this torch light app needs 124 permissions, including 15 dangerous ones. 
Alternatively, we have found a torch light application, that only needs 2 
permissions, none of them being dangerous.
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